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Deterring Torture:  
The Preventive Power of Criminal Law 
and its Promise for Inhibiting State 
Abuses
Francesca Laguardia*
ABSTRACT
The use of torture in the War on Terror reinvigorated a longstanding debate 
about how to prevent such human rights violations, and whether they should 
be criminalized. Using US history as a case study, this article argues that the 
criminal sanction is likely to be more successful in preventing such abuses 
than many other often suggested methods. Analyzing thousands of pages of 
released government documents as an archive leads to the counterintuitive 
finding that torturers were often deterred, at least momentarily, by fear of 
criminal liability, and would have been successfully deterred if not for the 
lack of prior prosecutions. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Immediately following the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) requested authority to detain and interrogate 
suspected terrorists, an authority that was quickly granted.1 By December 
* Francesca Laguardia is Assistant Professor, Justice Studies, Montclair State University. J.D. 
2007, Ph.D. 2012, Institute for Law and Society, New York University. Former Director of 
Research, Center on Law and Security at NYU School of Law. The author is extremely grateful 
to David Greenberg, Mihaela Serban, Jessica Henry, Venezia Michaelson, CalvinJohn Smiley, 
Gabriel Rubin, Stephen Schulhofer, Candace McCoy, Charles Strozier, George Andreopoulos, 
John Kleinig, and Mihaela Serban for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
  1. John Rizzo, 9/11: Three Major Mistakes, Defining iDeas (8 Sept. 2011), available at http://
www.hoover.org/research/911-three-major-mistakes. 
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of 2002, reporters were exposing rumors that United States government 
agents were using stress positions and other physically coercive methods 
to gather intelligence from detainees seized in the War on Terror.2 In 2004, 
pictures of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib detention facility became public, 
as did the first of the legal memos, written for the White House, authoriz-
ing the use of torture.3 By 2006, the field of human rights scholarship was 
flooded with articles and reports attempting to prove the criminality of the 
US government’s torture policy; a government sanctioned, institutionalized, 
gross violation of human rights.4 
But this strategy of criminalization and prosecution of human rights 
violations, while lauded by activist organizations such as Amnesty Interna-
tional and Human Rights Watch,5 has also been heavily criticized. Scholars 
have cited evidence that such changes have resulted in more careful abuse, 
rather than substantive change.6 
This article argues that such pessimism ignores the promise of deterrence 
for the social control of states. Using the Unites States’ formal utilization of 
torture as a case study, this article suggests several points at which actors 
in the process of legitimizing and employing torture were deterred. Indeed, 
contemporary analyses of deterrence offer reasons to believe that similarly 
situated persons, generally high level government employees, are likely to be 
deterred from abuse if they believe their actions might qualify as criminal. 
At the same time, the development of the United States’ torture policy gives 
reason to believe that efforts to socialize populations or build institutional 
oversight (standard noncriminal solutions to the problem of state violations 
of human rights) are unlikely to be as effective as the personal deterrence 
of government actors. 
  2. Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse But Defends Interrogations: “Stress 
and Duress” Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, 
Wash. Post, 26 Dec. 2002, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356_pf.html. 
  3. the torture PaPers: the roaD to abu ghraib (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 
2005); seymour m. hersh, Chain of CommanD: the roaD from 9/11 to abu ghraib (2004).
  4 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush Ad-
ministration, 37 Case W. J. int’l. l. 389 (2006); amnesty int’l, uniteD states of ameriCa: 
human Dignity DenieD: torture anD aCCountability in the “War on terror,” Index No. AMR 
51/145/2004 (2004); human rights first, attorney general Confirmation hearings, baCkgrounD 
PaPers on alberto gonzales: torture, exeCutive PoWer, the geneva Conventions anD military 
Commissions (2004), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/
brief_20041220_Gonz_all.pdf. 
  5. Id.; amnesty int’l, usa: Crimes anD imPunity (2015), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
sites/default/files/cia_torture_report_amr_5114322015.pdf; human rights WatCh, getting 
aWay With torture: the bush aDministration anD mistreatment of Detainees (2011); see also 
Karen Engle, Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights, 100 Cornell 
l. rev. 1069 (2015).
  6. Courtenay Ryals Conrad & Will H. Moore, What Stops the Torture? 54 am. J. Pol. sCi. 
459 (2010); Darius m. reJali, torture anD DemoCraCy (2007); Charles r. ePP, the rights 
revolution: laWyers, aCtivists, anD suPreme Courts in ComParative PersPeCtive (1998); James 
Ron, Varying Methods of State Violence, 51 int’l org. 275 (1997).
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This article begins with a brief description of the current state of research 
on curbing abuse by states in emergency. I then turn to current research on 
deterrence, and note the likelihood that individuals in prestigious positions 
after long careers are particularly deterrable.
After describing my methodology, I explain why those persons institut-
ing torture in the United States fit the category of highly deterrable actors. 
I then use the history of the torture policy to illustrate the fact that federal 
agents (both CIA agents and attorneys) were intensely concerned with the 
threat of criminal sanctions, and that they changed their behavior based on 
that concern. In sharp contrast to the fictional depiction of the dedicated spy 
who acts in spite of the knowledge that he will be abandoned by his country 
the moment he is discovered, CIA agents in the thick of the interrogation 
program showed a firm interest in ensuring they would not be prosecuted, 
and refused to act until those assurances were given. Those moments when 
the approval was sought, and the fact that CIA agents refused to move for-
ward until it was received, are moments when we can see the strength and 
deterrent effects of criminal law. At the same time, the CIA’s self-protective 
secrecy successfully disabled common mechanisms of oversight, including 
public outcry, institutional oversight, and the socialization of elites.
I conclude that activists have ignored traditional criminological reason-
ing to their own detriment, and that (as is logically suggested by deterrence 
theory), prosecutions are necessary in order to successfully prevent future 
reoccurrences of this crime.
A. A Note on Terminology
Throughout this article, I refer to the tactics used by the CIA as torture. This 
term has been hotly debated, as is the extent to which CIA agents understood 
their actions to qualify as such. To some, there is a vital distinction between 
“torture,” and “merely” inhumane and degrading, or abuse.7
But these qualifications only matter in the context of legal proceedings. 
Those activists and organizations that work to make human rights abuses 
illegal uniformly agree that the CIA’s conduct was torture.8 A plain language 
understanding of the word torture would be satisfied with the infliction of 
severe pain, particularly with the intent of gaining information from some-
one.9 Alvin Krongard, who held the third highest position in the CIA from 
  7. Sanford Levinson, In Quest of a “Common Conscience”: Reflections on the Current 
Debate About Torture. 1 J. nat’l. seC. l. & Pol’y. 231 (2005); Michael M. Lewis, A Dark 
Descent into Reality: Making the Case for an Objective Definition of Torture, 67 Wash. 
& lee l. rev. 77 (2010).
  8. amnesty int’l, supra note 5; human rights WatCh, supra note 5; amnesty int’l, supra note 
4; human rights first, supra note 4.
  9. See Merriam-Webster dictionary’s definition of torture, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/torture.2015. 
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2001-2004, recently echoed this sentiment. He stated, “[CIA tactics were] 
meant to make [detainees] as uncomfortable as possible. So I assume for, 
without getting into semantics, that’s torture. We were told by legal authori-
ties that we could torture people.”10 
Krongard’s statement highlights the fact that actors implementing torture 
policy were highly concerned with whether or not their torture was legal, or 
more accurately, whether using torture would put them at risk of criminal 
sanctions, even while they were aware that their actions fit the category of 
social harms the Torture Statute was written to prevent.11 Yet countless schol-
arly works have been mired in arguments about whether or not the extreme 
abuse utilized by the Bush Administration amounted to torture. Rather than 
compound this confusion, I use the word “torture” to describe these actions. 
B. Preventing Human Rights Abuses: The State of the Field 
Determining what stops governments from abusing human rights (for in-
stance, by instituting torture) has become one of the great projects of the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.12 While acceptance of human 
rights treaties and increasing passage of human rights legislation generated 
hope among advocates, these formal legal outcomes have largely proven 
to be “empty promises,” as states have continued to engage in abuses and 
repression.13 The pessimism regarding the law’s potential to change state 
practices is even more extreme regarding states in emergency.14 In regards to 
torture specifically, research and long debated political philosophies suggest 
 10. Dan Froomkin. New Effort to Rebut Torture Report Undermined as Former Official 
Admits the Obvious, the interCePt, 5 Aug. 2015, available at https://firstlook.org/thein-
tercept/2015/08/05/new-campaign-rebut-torture-allegations-undermined-former-official-
admits-obvious/. 
 11. Definition of Torture Under 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A, 28 Op. O.L.C. 297 (2004), available 
at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2004/12/31/op-olc-v028-p0297.
pdf. 
 12. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Justice Lost! The Failure of International 
Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most, 44 J. PeaCe res. 407 (2007).
 13. Id.; Conrad & Moore, supra note 6; reJali, supra note 6; ePP, supra note 6; Ron, supra 
note 6; A. E. Dick Howard, The Essence of Constitutionalism, in Constitutionalism anD 
human rights: ameriCa: PolanD, anD franCe: a biCentennial Colloquium at the miller Center 
3 (Kenneth W. Thompson & Rett R. Ludwikowski eds., 1991).
 14. Steven C. Poe, C. Neal Tate & Linda Camp Keith, Repression of the Human Right to 
Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993, 
43 int’l stuD. q. 291 (1999); Claudio Grossman, States of Emergency: Latin America 
and the United States, in Constitutionalism anD rights: the influenCe of the uniteD states 
Constitution abroaD 176, 188 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990); Jose Luis 
Cea, Chile’s Difficult Return to Constitutional Democracy, 20 PS 665 (1987); Hugo E. 
Frühling, Human Rights in Constitutional Order and in Political Practice in Latin America, 
in Constitutionalism anD DemoCraCy: transition in the ContemPorary WorlD 85 (Douglas 
Greenberg, Stanley N. Katz, Melanie Beth Oliviero & Steven C. Wheatley eds., 1993).
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that reluctance to engage in torture is substantially diminished in the face 
of a violent threat to the state.15
Still, researchers have found reason to hope that state abuses of human 
rights can be prevented. Some have focused on institutional constraints, 
including the ability of an independent judiciary to oversee executive ex-
cesses.16 Some look to the presence of training programs (within organizations 
responsible for detention) that emphasize the importance of human rights 
and the possible penalties for violations.17 Constructivist scholars have argued 
that implementation of human rights norms requires the internalization of 
those norms among governmental elites.18 
Scholars have also suggested that human rights advocates, among the 
populace, the international community, and the NGO community, might 
apply sufficient pressure to force states to abide by human rights-protective 
treaties.19 However, this claim is subject to substantial criticism by skeptics 
focusing on the long history of human rights violations in the face of con-
stitutional and international proscriptions.20 
These methods exhibit a fundamental flaw, in that they rely on discovery 
of abuse by human rights (or rule of law) advocates. In the case of interfer-
 15. Conrad & Moore, supra note 6, at 468; Christian A. Davenport, Will H. Moore & 
David Armstrong The Puzzle of Abu Ghraib: Are Democratic Institutions a Palliative or 
Panacea? (8 Dec. 2007) (unpublished, University of Maryland), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1022367; see also Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty 
Hands, 2 Phil. & Pub. aff. 160 (1973).
 16. Linda Camp Keith, C. Neal Tate, & Steven C. Poe, Is the Law a Mere Parchment Barrier 
to Human Rights Abuse?, 71 J. Pol. 644 (2009); Frank B. Cross, The Relevance of Law 
in Human Rights Protection, 19 int’l rev. l. & eCon. 87 (1999); Gerard J. Blasi & David 
Louis Cingranelli, Do Constitutions and Institutions Help Protect Human Rights?, in 4 
PoliCy stuDies anD DeveloPing nations: human rights anD DeveloPing Countries 223 (David 
Louis Cingranelli ed., 1996); Christian A. Davenport, “Constitutional Promises” and 
Repressive Reality: A Cross-National Time-Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil 
Liberties are Suppressed, 58 J. Pol. 627 (1996); L.W.H. Ackermann, Constitutional Pro-
tection of Human Rights: Judicial Review, 21 Colum. hum. rts. l. rev.59 (1989); subrata 
roy ChoWDhury, rule of laW in a state of emergenCy: the Paris minimum stanDarDs of human 
rights norms in a state of emergenCy (1989).
 17. Conrad & Moore, supra note 6.
 18. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law, 54 Duke l. J. 621 (2004); thomas risse, stePhen C. roPP, & kathryn 
sikkink, the PoWer of human rights: international norms anD DomestiC Change (1999); mar-
garet e. keCk & kathryn sikkink, aCtivists beyonD borDers: aDvoCaCy netWorks in international 
PolitiCs (1998); martha finnemore, national interests in international soCiety (1996).
 19. Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 12; beth a. simmons, mobilizing for human rights: 
international laW in DomestiC PolitiCs (2009); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: 
Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 int’l org. 689 (2008); 
Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Global Civil Society and Ethnic Social Movements in the Contemporary 
World, 19 soC. f. 63 (2004); Risse et al, supra note 18; keCk & sikkink, supra note 18; 
see Conrad & Moore, supra note 6.
 20. ePP, supra note 6; Howard, supra note 13.
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ence from NGOs or the public, pressure to abandon torture appears only 
after the torture has been discovered. Similarly, in order for institutional 
oversight to successfully prevent torture, there must be: 1) government 
actors who are sufficiently committed to anti-torture norms that they will 
interfere with plans to torture; and, 2) iron-clad mechanisms by which plans 
to torture will be discovered. As is shown below, the existence of holes in 
these defenses—either a failure to socialize every single government actor 
or a failure to make mechanisms of discovery iron-clad-will will be seized 
upon by a motivated government.
Finally, order for abuse to be discovered, it must occur in the first place. 
In contrast, prevention has always been one of the primary purposes of 
criminal law.21 Rather than interrupting or punishing abuse, it would be far 
preferable to prevent its occurrence entirely. Perhaps surprisingly, criminal 
sanctions offer great promise in this regard. 
C. The Promise of Deterrence
The preventive potency of the threat of criminal prosecution may surprise 
readers, as many of the hurdles facing the institutional solutions above 
should also prove problematic for the strength of deterrence. Moreover, every 
crime committed in the United States today stands as a stark reminder that 
deterrence fails regularly.22 
But research suggests that, for certain people, deterrence can be effec-
tive. And an examination of the CIA’s use of torture leads to the conclusion 
that many of those factors that increase the efficacy of deterrence may be 
particularly present in the types of individuals who are likely to become 
official torturers in established democracies.
While formal sanctions may themselves be rather ineffective at deterring 
potential criminals,23 the shame associated with those sanctions may have a 
strong deterrent effect.24 Alex Piquero et al. relate this effect to the strength 
of the (potential) offender’s social bonds, an argument that has much sup-
port in criminological literature.25 According to this research, offenders who 
 21. anDreW ashWorth & luCia zeDner, Preventive JustiCe (2014).
 22. DaviD m. kenneDy, DeterrenCe anD Crime Prevention: reConsiDering the ProsPeCt of sanCtion 
(2009).
 23. Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of 
Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 Just. q. 173 (1987).
 24. John braithWaite, Crime, shame anD reintegration (1989); Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond 
Paternoster, Enduring Individual Differences and Rational Choice Theories of Crime, 27 
l. & soC’y rev. 467 (1993).
 25. Alex R. Piquero, Raymond Paternoster, Greg Pogarsky & Thomas Loughran, Elaborating 
the Individual Difference Component in Deterrence Theory, 7 ann. rev. l. & soC. sCi. 
335 (2011).
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have made a large investment in social conformity will be highly unlikely 
to threaten their standing by breaking the law and risking formal sanctions 
(which would indicate, socially, a sharp break from conformity).26 
Investments in conformity would include successful employment.27 Sat-
isfying employment and careers rather than “jobs” are particularly related 
to successful social control.28 They offer a reason to conform and greater 
social investment.29
Additionally, criminal sanctions more effectively deter individuals who 
exhibit greater self-control and constraint.30 For deterrence to be effective, 
individuals must rationally evaluate the possible repercussions of their ac-
tions. Therefore, only those who are predisposed to engage in analysis of 
future repercussions may be deterred.31 
It may be in part for this reason that studies suggest criminal regulation 
has a strong deterrent effect on potential white-collar offenders.32 This effect 
appears to be related to the fact that potential white-collar criminals are 
particularly concerned about their reputation and social standing.33 
The same might be said of attempts to deter elite government officials 
debating the use of torture. The very nature of the positions these individuals 
hold constitutes investment in social conformity. Even without assuming that 
 26. Id.; Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, Personal Capital and Social Control: The 
Deterrence Implications of a Theory of Individual Differences in Criminal Offending, 32 
Criminology 581 (1994); franklin e. zimring & gorDon J. haWkins, DeterrenCe: the legal 
threat in Crime Control (1973).
 27. Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Crime and Deviance Over the Life Course: The 
Salience of Adult Social Bonds, 55 am. soC. rev. 609 (1990); John H. Laub & Robert J. 
Sampson, Turning Points in the Life Course: Why Change Matters to the Study of Crime, 
31 Criminology 301 (1993).
 28. neal shover, great PretenDers: Pursuits anD Careers of Persistent thieves (1996); Troy Duster, 
Crime, Youth Unemployment, and the Black Urban Underclass, 33 Crime & Delinq. 300 
(1987).
 29. Christopher Uggen, Ex-Offenders and the Conformist Alternative: A Job Quality Model 
of Work and Crime, 46 soC. Probs. 127 (1999); Laub & Sampson, supra note 27; Jackson 
Toby, Social Disorganization and Stake in Conformity: Complementary Factors in the 
Predatory Behavior of Hoodlums, 48 J. Crim. l., Criminology & PoliCe sCi. 121 (1957).
 30. Piquero et al, supra note 25; Nagin & Paternoster, supra note 24; miChael r. gottfreDson 
& travis hirsChi, a general theory of Crime (1990); zimring & haWkins, supra note 26.
 31. Piquero et al, supra note 25; Nagin & Paternoster, supra note 24; gottfreDson & hirsChi, 
supra note 30; zimring & haWkins, supra note 26.
 32. Sally S. Simpson, Making Sense of White-Collar Crime: Theory and Research, 8 ohio 
state J. Crim. l. 481 (2011); sally s. simPson, Joel garner & Carole gibbs, Why Do CorPora-
tions obey environmental laW? assessing Punitive anD CooPerative strategies of CorPorate Crime 
Control (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/220693.pdf; Mark 
A. Cohen, Empirical Research on the Deterrent Effect of Environmental Monitoring and 
Enforcement, 30 envtl. l. reP. 10245 (2000).
 33. Sally S. Simpson, Carole Gibbs, Melissa Rorie, Lee Ann Slocum, Mark A. Cohen, & Mi-
chael Vandenbergh, An Empirical Assessment of Corporate Environmental Crime-Control 
Strategies, 103 J. Crim. laW & Criminology 231, 238–39 (2013); simPson et al., supra note 
32. 
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individuals who choose to work in law enforcement may have heightened 
belief in conventional norms and legality, a long and successful career is, in 
itself, a social investment—one made by most authors of the torture policy, 
and likely to add to the deterrent effect of criminal prohibitions. 
D. Methodology
In analyzing the development of the US policy of torture, I look to the reports 
and documents that have been released by the government over the past 
ten years. In 2004, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) began an 
investigation into the use of torture by US government agents. Eventually, 
SASC released not only the declassified portions of the report, but support-
ing documents related to their investigation.34 Additionally, investigations 
into later discoveries that the CIA had destroyed videotapes of interrogation 
sessions led to the release of additional documents, as did the CIA Inspector 
General’s investigation into the controversy35 and the investigation by the 
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) at the Department of Justice.36 
These included faxes and emails between attorneys and officials describing 
the legal reasoning as it evolved, and notes from meetings concerning the 
practices. Finally, and most recently, the Senate Select Committee on Intel-
ligence (SSCI) released a detailed report on the development of the CIA’s 
use of “Enhanced Interrogation Tactics”.37 
Using these documents, I analyzed the development of the torture policy 
to determine the thought processes and motivations of the lawyers who at-
tempted to justify torture in the post-2001 era. While these documents remain 
incomplete, and therefore limited, they corroborate each other in multiple 
areas, including timeline and stated purpose. The candid nature of notes, 
drafts, and emails adds to their reliability. Together, they offer an archival 
history of the development of the legal reasoning used to justify torture. 
 34. senate armeD serviCes Committee, us senate, inquiry into the treatment of Detainees in u.s. 
CustoDy (2008), available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Detainee-Report-Final_April-22-2009.pdf. 
 35. Central intelligenCe agenCy (Cia), offiCe of the insPeCtor general, Counterterrorism Detention 
anD interrogation aCtivities (sePt. 2001–oCt. 2003) (2004), available at https://fas.org/irp/
cia/product/ig-interrog.pdf. 
 36. u.s. DePt. of JustiCe, offiCe of Professional resPonsibility, investigation into the offiCe of legal 
Counsel’s memoranDa ConCerning issues relating to the Central intelligenCe agenCy’s use of 
‘enhanCeD interrogation teChniques’ on susPeCteD terrorists (2009), available at https://www.
aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/opr20100219/20090729_OPR_Final_Report_with_20100719_
declassifications.pdf. 
 37. senate seleCt Committee on intelligenCe, Committee stuDy of the Cia’s Detention anD interro-
gation Program exeCutive summary (2014), available at https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/
sscistudy1.pdf.
2017 Deterring Torture 197
II. TORTURERS’ POTENTIAL TO BE DETERRED
The decision to utilize torture is not (and was not) made by low-level officers 
or recent hires. To the contrary, the program was debated and created with 
the input of the Director of the CIA, George Tenet, CIA Deputy Director of 
Operations, James Pavitt, Chief of the Counterterrorism Center, Joseph Cofer 
Black, and Black’s successor at the Counterterrorism Center, Jose Rodriguez.38 
The SSCI Report describes an interrogation program conceived of and run by 
“CIA Headquarters,” implying consistent oversight by high-level members of 
the CIA. For instance, while Abu Zubaydah was still hospitalized, personnel 
at CIA Headquarters discussed the use of coercive interrogation techniques 
against Abu Zubaydah and the “CIA Headquarters formally proposed that 
Abu Zubaydah be kept in an all-white room that was lit 24 hours a day, that 
Abu Zubaydah not be provided any amenities, that his sleep be disrupted, 
that loud noise be constantly fed into his cell, and that only a small number 
of people interact with him.”39
These high level CIA officials are almost certainly long-term CIA employ-
ees with a high level of investment in the agency. As an example, Alfreda 
Bikowsky, one of the primary actors in the CIA’s torture policy, appears to 
have had an almost ten-year career in the CIA prior to the commencement 
of the enhanced interrogation program.40 Over the course of her career 
she was promoted several times.41 George Tenet had worked his way up 
from public schools and state college to a Master’s degree from Columbia 
 38. See, e.g., id. at 11–13, 37, 41, 43.
 39. Id. at 26.
 40. While Bikowsky’s biography has been removed from government web pages, she is 
described in Jane Mayer’s the Dark siDe: the insiDe story of hoW the War on terror turneD 
into a War on ameriCan iDeals 34–36 (2008) as a former soviet analyst who was brought 
in to Alec Station by Michael Scheuer when it was set up in 1996, suggesting that she 
had already worked at the CIA prior to that time. She is similarly identified as “a former 
Soviet analyst who has worked in the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center and in the al Qaeda 
unit since the mid-1990s,” by Matthew Cole in one of the first articles identifying her 
as a key to the CIA’s use of rendition and torture, Bin Laden Expert Accused of Shaping 
CIA Deception on “Torture” Program, nbC neWs, 16 Dec. 2014, available at http://
www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/bin-laden-expert-accused-shaping-cia-deception-
torture-program-n269551. While unnamed in these articles, the agent was later identified 
as Bikowsky in Glenn Greenwald & Peter Maass, Meet Alfreda Bikowsky, the Senior 
Officer at the Center of the CIA’s Torture Scandals, the interCePt, 19 Dec. 2014, available 
at https://theintercept.com/2014/12/19/senior-cia-officer-center-torture-scandals-alfreda-
bikowsky/; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, Wash. Post, 2 Nov. 
2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/
AR2005110101644.html. 
 41. Jane mayer, supra note 40, at 273; see Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, CIA Officers 
Make Grave Mistakes, Get Promoted, assoCiateD Press, 9 Feb. 2011, available at http://
www.nbcnews.com/id/41484983/ns/us_news-security/t/cia-officers-make-grave-mistakes-
get-promoted/#.WC32eLIrK70; see also Greenwald & Maass, supra note 40.
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University.42 He began working for the Senate in 1982 and eventually be-
came Staff Director for the SSCI.43 Tenet worked in the SSCI for eight years, 
then two years at the National Security Council, before becoming Deputy 
Director of Central Intelligence, then Director of Central Intelligence two 
years after that.44 
Similarly, Jose Rodriguez was employed by the CIA for over two decades 
before being selected to head the Counter Terrorism Center, achieving a series 
of promotions over that time.45 James Pavitt progressed from an intelligence 
officer in the Army to a legislative assistant in the House of Representatives, 
to a career in the CIA that spanned twenty-four years and a series of senior 
positions (Chief of Station, Chief of the Directorate of Operation’s Counter-
proliferation Division) and culminated in his position as Deputy Director of 
Operations from 1999–2004.46 Cofer Black’s career at the CIA lasted nearly 
three decades, including roles such as Chief of Station and Deputy Chief of 
the Latin American Division.47 
Careers such as these are to be expected at high levels of government 
office—they consist of decades of increasing responsibility and increasing 
prestige, which suggest a high level of investment. We should expect that 
high achieving government actors would be reluctant to lose these positions, 
as tends to occur when criminal activity is revealed.48
The successes of these individuals also imply their own capacity for self-
control and analysis of future repercussions. Indeed, these are individuals 
in jobs that specifically require future oriented analysis and evaluation of 
possible repercussions from foolish actions. We should expect that career 
employees would display low levels of impulsivity, at least in regards to their 
professional reputations, and high levels of forethought. 
 42. Anne E., James Kornblut, Jere Rutenberg & Hester, A Hungry Kid May Lead CIA, Daily 
neWs, 21 Mar. 1997, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/hungry-
kid-lead-cia-article-1.763910; George Tenet Fast Facts, Cnn, 29 Dec. 2015, available 
at http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/06/us/george-tenet-fast-facts/index.html.
 43. Nomination of George J. Tenet to be Director of Central Intelligence: Hearing Before 
the Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Hrg. 105–314, 105th Cong. (1997), available 
at http://fas.org/irp/congress/1997_hr/tenet.pdf.
 44. John Diamond, CIA Director’s Allies Outnumber His Enemies, usa toDay, 9 Oct. 2002, 
available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2002-10-09-tenet_x.htm.
 45. Commending Jose A. Rodriguez, Jr., H.R. Res. 139, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted), avail-
able at https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?141+ful+HR139+pdf.
 46. Vernon Loeb, Rebuilding Clandestine Operations, Wash. Post, 20 Sept. 1999, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/loeb/loeb092099.htm.
 47 Biography of J. Cofer Black, u.s. DeP’t. st. arChive (21 Nov. 2002), available at http://2001-
2009.state.gov/outofdate/bios/b/15367.htm.
 48. See, for instance, the description of General Petraeus’ fall from grace in Justin Wm. 
Moyer, Gen. David Petraeus: From Hero to Zero, Wash. Post, 24 Apr. 2015, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/04/24/gen-david-petraeus-
from-hero-to-zero/. 
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In other words, we might assume that high-level state officials would be 
some of the most deterrable potential offenders. The personal characteristics 
and situations of these individuals fall into categories of potential offenders 
who are most likely to be deterred by formal sanctions and the informal 
losses that would follow. These individuals are likely to look for and avoid 
the social stigma, loss of prestige, and personal difficulties associated with 
criminal prosecution. 
And in fact, this is what we see in multiple reports and released docu-
ments describing the CIA’s utilization of torture. Indeed, the success of the 
threat of prosecution in deterring government actors considering the use 
of torture is shocking, given the level of secrecy these actors secured for 
themselves. While deterrent effect is heavily dependent on the perceived 
likelihood of apprehension,49 government actors debating the use of torture 
were deterred several times, even while confident in their insulation from 
oversight. They modified their actions based on the possibility of prosecu-
tion. They hesitated before utilizing torture and at times, for brief periods, 
they stopped. 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORTURE POLICY
As I noted above, following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the 
CIA immediately became interested in the use of torture.50 But the speed 
of the CIA’s interest in interrogation is rivaled by its concern over criminal 
prosecution. Two months later, well before any terrorist had been captured 
rising to the level of sufficient importance to torture, the CIA was already 
investigating its own possible criminal liability. This research began as early 
as November 2001,51 while the first terrorist to be considered for torture, 
Abu Zubaydah, was not captured until March 2002.52
Nor did this concern disappear in the face of the (presumably immedi-
ate) need to obtain whatever information Abu Zubaydah had. Indeed, in the 
spring of 2002, the United States intelligence community believed itself to 
be running against the clock, desperately trying to determine the structure 
of al-Qaeda and its next targets while convinced that a nuclear attack was 
imminent. The torture of Abu Zubaydah was believed to be necessary to 
 49. Daniel S. Nagin. Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 Crime & Just. 199 (2013); 
Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence: A Review of the Evidence by a Criminologist for Economists, 
5 ann. rev. eCon. 83 (2013).
 50. Rizzo, supra note 1; senate armeD serviCes Committee, supra note 34.
 51. senate seleCt Committee on intelligenCe, supra note 37, at 19.
 52. David Rose, Tortured Reasoning, vanity fair, 16 Dec. 2008, available at http://www.
vanityfair.com/magazine/2008/12/torture200812.
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reveal information to prevent that attack.53 Still, the CIA insisted on obtain-
ing legal approval for the specific tactics it desired to use. 
A. The CIA’s Preoccupation with Prosecution
The CIA first approached its own General Counsel, and when that attorney 
was uncertain about his response, continued to wait for the approval of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ).54 The CIA first hoped for an advance declina-
tion to prosecute, which might have insulated CIA torturers from any future 
prosecution.55 When no such promise was forthcoming, the CIA turned to 
the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) for an explanation of the extent 
to which interrogators could apply pressure without running afoul of the 
Torture Statute.56 
By mid-April 2002, John Yoo and Jennifer Koester of OLC were research-
ing the legal implications of proposed CIA tactics.57 By early July 2002, CIA 
agents had met personally with Yoo in order to discuss twelve particular 
techniques, and they quickly received a letter in response stating that Yoo 
did not believe the techniques would violate any criminal statutes.58 But this 
statement was not enough reassurance for the CIA to begin using torture. 
Instead, the CIA continued to wait for a more convincing assurance that 
there would be no criminal prosecutions. 
On 24 July 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft gave oral approval of 
ten out of twelve proposed techniques, including attention grasp, walling, 
 53. Lesley Stahl, Hard Measures: Ex-CIA Head Defends Post 9/11 Tactics, 60 minutes, 29 Apr. 
2012, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hard-measures-ex-cia-head-defends-
post-9-11-tactics/; ClassifieD resPonse to the u.s. DePt. of JustiCe offiCe of Professional 
resPonsibility ClassifieD rePort DateD July 29, 2009, at 14–15 (9 Oct. 2009), available at 
https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/opr-bybeefinal.pdf [hereinafter ClassifieD resPonse to the u.s. 
DePt. of JustiCe].
 54. senate armeD serviCes Committee, supra note 34, at 33, 37; CIA, supra note 35, at 14; Clas-
sifieD resPonse to the u.s. DePt. of JustiCe, supra note 53, at 14, 15.
 55. u.s. DePt. of JustiCe, offiCe of Professional resPonsibility, supra note 36, at 37; see also 
senate seleCt Committee on intelligenCe, supra note 37, at 33; For a discussion of decli-
nations to prosecute see, e.g., John Sifton, The Get Out of Jail Free Card for Torture, 
slate.Com, 29 Mar. 2010, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2010/03/the_get_out_of_jail_free_card_for_torture.html (describing other 
cases in which advance declinations prevented prosecution of CIA agents for abuse of 
detainees).
 56. senate armeD serviCes Committee, supra note 34, at 38–39; u.s. DePt. of JustiCe, offiCe of 
Professional resPonsibility, supra note 36, at 37, 39; 18 U.S.C. §§2340–2340A.
 57. Id.
 58. senate seleCt Committee on intelligenCe, supra note 37, at 33–34; Letter from John Yoo, 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to John Rizzo, Acting 
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (13 July 2002), available at http://www.
justice.gov/olc/olc-foia-electronic-reading-room.
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facial hold, facial slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress posi-
tions, sleep deprivation, use of diapers, and use of insects (Abu Zubaydah 
was known to have a fear of insects), but still the CIA waited. On 26 July 
2002, Attorney General Ashcroft orally approved the use of the waterboard 
as well, but still the CIA waited for written authorization.59
On 1 August 2002, OLC completed two memos, signed by Jay Bybee 
but authored by Yoo. One memo was a broad discussion of the elements 
of the crime of torture and the conditions necessary to violate that statute 
sufficiently to make prosecution likely,60 the other a specific examination 
of the tactics the CIA had proposed.61 Only once the OLC had promised in 
these formal memos that prosecutions were unlikely, and specifically outlined 
the manner in which interrogators could act to avoid prosecutions, did the 
“enhanced interrogation” of Abu Zubaydah begin.62 That interrogation was 
limited to the eleven techniques that had been approved in the memos—a 
final technique never received approval and, as far as we know now, was 
not employed.63 Even these promises were insufficient to maintain the CIA’s 
activities. 
Over and over again, CIA agents and officials doubled back to reassure 
themselves that no prosecutions were forthcoming. Interrogators remained 
concerned about the legality of their actions. At one point, interrogators 
voiced concerns that they were “approach[ing] the legal limit” of the in-
terrogation techniques.64 Rodriguez responded that discussion of legality 
should be avoided in emails, a clear reference to concerns about future 
legal proceedings.65 When CIA agents became interested in using water 
in what appeared to be a variation of waterboarding, they returned to the 
CIA General Counsel’s office to check with attorneys before proceeding.66
In 2003, after President George W. Bush assured the public that detainees 
were being treated “humanely,” the CIA became concerned again that its 
actions might result in criminal prosecutions. CIA officials briefed members 
of Congress and requested new written approval from OLC. Once again, 
 59. senate seleCt Committee on intelligenCe, supra note 37, at 32, 35–37.
 60. John Yoo, Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A 
(1 Aug. 2002), available at https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/886061/download.
 61. John Yoo, Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (1 Aug. 2002), available 
at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/05/memo-bybee2002.pdf.
 62. Indeed, Bybee claims he only signed off on the memos because the CIA was refusing 
to interrogate Abu Zubaydah, and the pressure to interrogate (based on the belief of 
impending threat) was so great. ClassifieD resPonse to the u.s. DePt. of JustiCe, supra note 
53, at 14.
 63. Id.; CIA, supra note 35, at 14.
 64. senate seleCt Committee on intelligenCe, supra note 37, at 43.
 65. Id.
 66. Id. at 107.
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until those reassurances of protection from prosecution were granted, the 
CIA refrained from engaging in torture.67
In 2006, when the Supreme Court decided in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to detainees 
at Guantanamo,68 the CIA’s concerns about criminal prosecution returned. 
Once again, the CIA ceased torturing detainees until it was granted specific, 
written reassurance from the OLC that its activities did not violate criminal 
prohibitions.69 Indeed, the CIA appears to have returned often for this reas-
surance. In 2004, the OLC wrote a series of letters to the General Counsel 
for the CIA, apparently in response to requests for specific clarification that 
interrogation of specific detainees was authorized.70 In May 2005, the OLC 
wrote two memos, providing once again the authority provided in the original 
August 2002 memos.71 As noted above, in 2006 the CIA actually ceased 
torturing detainees until it could be reassured that it was not violating any 
criminal statutes. In 2007, it apparently required these reassurances again, as 
 67. Id. at 116–17.
 68. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
 69. senate seleCt Committee on intelligenCe, supra note 37, at 159, 162–63; see also Memorandum 
from Steven G. Bradbury for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence 
Agency, Re: Application of the Detainee Treatment Act to Conditions of Confinement 
at Central Intelligence Agency Detention Facilities (31 Aug. 2006), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/2006_0831_OLC_memo_to_Rizzo.
pdf; Letter from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (31 
Aug. 2006), available at https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/886291/download. 
 70. Letter from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, 
to John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (26 Aug. 2004), 
available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-
rizzo2004–3.pdf; Letter from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (6 
Sept. 2004), available at https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/886101/download; Letter from 
Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to John A. 
Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (20 Sept. 2004), available 
at https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/886266/download. 
 71. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central 
Intelligence Agency, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to the Combined 
Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (10 
May 2005), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2013/10/21/
memo-bradbury2005-2.pdf; Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy 
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–
2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al 
Qaeda Detainee (10 May 2005), available at https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/886271/
download; Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, Office of Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, 
Central Intelligence Agency, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 
16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the 
Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (30 May 2005), available at https://www.
justice.gov/olc/file/886281/download.
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the OLC provided still another memo in response to a CIA General Counsel 
request for clarification of the legality of six interrogation tactics, as well as 
four other letters regarding the legality of specific interrogations.72
Perhaps most importantly, mock burial was not employed by the CIA, 
not because the OLC stated it would be illegal but because the OLC had 
not yet made a determination on the technique, and the CIA did not want 
to wait any longer for legal authorization.73 While the SSCI states that this 
technique was never “formally considered by the OLC,” it appears the 
tactic was abandoned because Yoo had already determined that it would 
constitute torture.74 Either way, the possibility of prosecution (i.e. engaging 
activity that had not received the blessing of the DOJ as “legal”) was enough 
to deter the CIA.
This history suggests that the CIA, on both an individual and agency-
wide level, was highly concerned with the threat of legal sanctions. Further, 
the CIA would have refrained from torturing detainees, based on its fear of 
prosecution, if not for the legal approval it had received, and certainly if it 
had been told that prosecution was likely.75 As John Rizzo, former General 
Counsel to the CIA, admitted to a newspaper, “I could have stopped water-
boarding before it happened.”76 
 72. Letter from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
Legal Counsel, to the Associate General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (7 Nov. 
2007), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/
memo-bradbury2007-2.pdf; Letter from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to the Associate General Counsel, Central 
Intelligence Agency, (6 Nov. 2007), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-bradbury2007-2.pdf; Letter from Steven G. Bradbury, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to the Associate 
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (23 Aug. 2007) available at https://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-bradbury2007.pdf; Letter from 
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, 
to the Associate General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (24 July 2007), available 
at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/12/30/aclu-ii-072407.pdf; 
Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General , to 
John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, Re: Application of 
the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions to Certain Techniques That May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation 
of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (20 July 2007), available at https://www.justice.gov/
olc/file/886296/download. 
 73. ClassifieD resPonse to the u.s. DePt. of JustiCe, supra note 53, at 14, 15; CIA, supra note 
35, at 14.
 74. senate seleCt Committee on intelligenCe, supra note 37, at 37; u.s. DePt. of JustiCe, offiCe of 
Professional resPonsibility, supra note 36, at 178.
 75. See Mike Allen & Dana Priest, Memo on Torture Draws Focus to Bush, Wash. Post, 9 June 
2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26401-2004Jun8.
html.
 76. John Rizzo, I Could Have Stopped Waterboarding Before it Happened, PolitiCo mag., 5 
Jan. 2014, available at http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/waterboarding-
cia-lawyer-john-rizzo-torture-101758.html#.UyyBaVclNyU.
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To be sure, this concern was less than universal, and seemed to exist 
only at the extremes. The CIA waited for legal approval to begin using its 
twelve tactics, and once it gained that approval for a single detainee, it ap-
plied those techniques to numerous detainees without approval.77 CIA inter-
rogation training in November 2002 already included two techniques that 
had not been approved by the DOJ.78 The SSCI lists numerous times when 
lawyers’ requests for review were not heeded79 or the advice of attorneys was 
ignored.80 Indeed, the CIA regularly used techniques that were not approved, 
or interrogated detainees for whom enhanced interrogation had not been 
approved, or otherwise acted in contradiction with established guidelines.81 
But at the margins, in terms of decisions whether or not to use torture 
at all, the CIA continued to return to the OLC and other branches of gov-
ernment in order to ensure that it was still working within the bounds of its 
legal authority. Of course, seeking legal approval means very little if lawyers 
can bend law into meaninglessness. But in fact, the torture archive suggests 
that the law was far from trivial, even to those lawyers who found ways to 
authorize torture. 
B. The Lawyers and the Criminal Law.
As noted above, DOJ refused to grant an advance declination to prosecute 
to the CIA. The SSCI states that there is no evidence the request for a dec-
lination to prosecute ever reached the Attorney General,82 while the OPR 
report states that Michael Chertoff refused to give this declination.83 
 But the OLC, led by Yoo, pursued narrow and at times incredible inter-
pretations of relevant law in an apparent effort to insulate the CIA from legal 
liability. While a full discussion of the flaws of Yoo’s analyses are beyond the 
scope of this article, the majority of legal scholars agree that his analysis was 
highly flawed, and in places blatantly contradicted established law.84 Central 
to these criticisms are Yoo’s inclusion of defenses to possible prosecutions,85 
 77. senate seleCt Committee on intelligenCe, supra note 37, at 411.
 78. Id. at 58.
 79. Id. at 61.
 80. Id. at 58, 74, 124, 424 n. 2378. 
 81. Id. at 28–29, 54, 56 n. 278, 60, 63–64, 69, 85, 99–105, 112, 113 n. 665.
 82. Id. at 33.
 83. u.s. DePt. of JustiCe, offiCe of Professional resPonsibility, supra note 36, at 47, 48–49.
 84. See, e.g., the torture memos: rationalizing the unthinkable (David Cole ed., 2009); Mark 
Danner, The Twilight of Responsibility: Torture and the Higher Deniability, 49 hous. l. rev. 
71, 74, 86 (2012); DaviD luban, legal ethiCs anD human Dignity 172–205 (2007); freDeriCk 
a.o. sChWarz Jr. & aziz z. huq, unCheCkeD anD unbalanCeD: PresiDential PoWers in a time of 
terror (2007); Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 
1 J. nat’l. seC. l. & Pol’y 455 (2005).
 85. Yoo, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 60, at 39–46.
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an inclusion that many claim was both inaccurate and inappropriate,86 as 
well as his claims that the Torture Statute would only be violated if gov-
ernment agents successfully and purposefully caused a detainee a level of 
pain “that would ordinarily be associated with . . . death, organ failure, or 
serious impairment of body functions,”87 and that the President’s inherent 
Commander in Chief authority would allow the commission of even this 
level of abuse, as part of Executive wartime powers.88 
Yet, even given the shocking inaccuracy of the above claims, the memos 
show some restraint, given the history of the person writing them. Critics 
of the memos acknowledge that Yoo’s own legal ideologies would have al-
lowed for complete approval of any abuse committed under orders from the 
Executive, as part of the Commander in Chief’s wartime powers.89 Yoo had 
expressed this belief in prior writings.90 Moreover, Yoo was under no insti-
tutional constraints—he was working closely with the Vice President’s legal 
advisor, David Addington, and was insulated from most official oversight.91 
Yoo hesitated, but did in fact limit his final recommendations. This suggests 
a surprising amount of influence from legal doctrine.
Yoo’s hesitance is evident in the time it took him to complete the 
memos. Yoo and Koester began working on the memo on 11 April 2002.92 
Koester wrote four drafts of the memo, each time responding to comments 
Yoo made.93 In all, Yoo spent four months working on the memos, in the 
face of perceived nuclear threat, when complete approval might have been 
granted on the sole basis of a summary of his argument regarding executive 
powers (which he had already published once). Indeed, he only added a 
discussion of those powers after (and apparently in response to) a mid-July 
meeting with then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales.94 The defenses 
portion of the memos, similarly criticized, was also a late addition seemingly 
in response to that meeting.95
The memos did not suggest that all actions would be safe from prosecu-
tion. One warned that a jury likely would not be swayed by its reasoning. It 
 86. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 84; Danner, supra note 84, at 74; luban, supra note 84, at 
172–205.
 87. Yoo, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 60, at 6.
 88. Id. at 31–39. For criticism of this logic see Cole, supra note 84, at 8; Danner, supra 
note 84, at 78; luban, supra note 84, at 174; sChWartz & huq, supra note 84; Clark, 
supra note 84; W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 
91 Cornell l. rev. 67 (2005). As is discussed below, another source of criticism was the 
inclusion of possible defenses to prosecution (see id.).
 89. Cole, supra note 84.
 90. John Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of 
War Powers, 84 Cal. l. rev. 167 (1996).
 91. PhiliPPe sanDs, torture team: rumsfelD’s memo anD the betrayal of ameriCan values (2008).
 92. u.s. DePt. of JustiCe, offiCe of Professional resPonsibility, supra note 36, at 39–40.
 93. Id. at 40–43.
 94. Id. at 50.
 95. Id.
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further mentioned the authors’ inability to address the question of whether 
“rogue” ICC prosecutors might attempt prosecution. The memo also specified 
tactics that would go too far, including burning, and threats of imminent 
death. These warnings were a response to Yoo’s examination of prior cases 
where allegations of torture had resulted in lawsuits (attached as an appendix 
to the memo).96 Whether Yoo was genuinely concerned with the law or only 
protecting his clients from prosecution, the legal precedent proved too great 
to distinguish in these cases.
Yoo has been criticized for finding ways to say yes to every request made 
by the CIA,97 but in fact he did say no to one tactic. As was noted above, 
Yoo never addressed mock burial in writing, suggesting his reluctance to 
contradict a legal proscription he could not distinguish. 
IV. EXEMPLIFYING THE FAILURES OF ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT 
AND SOCIALIZATION OF ELITES
The case study of the US torture policy highlights the fundamental weakness 
of traditional efforts to curb state abuse: namely, the reliance on discovery of 
abuse as it occurs. The SSCI’s report demonstrates that the CIA consciously 
planned for no party, ever, to discover their actions. Seemingly verifying 
threats made to Abu Zubaydah that he would only leave CIA custody in 
a coffin-shaped box,98 and to Hambali that “he would never go to court, 
because ‘we can never let the world know what I have done to you,’”99 the 
CIA took extreme steps to make sure its program remained hidden, until its 
disclosure in 2004. Very few were informed of the program. Ambassadors, 
warned of the program so they would not hear about it from officials of 
countries hosting blacksites, were instructed not to discuss the program with 
any other State Department officials.100 Secretary of State Colin Powell and 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were not briefed on the program 
before it began.101 This was apparently purposeful, out of awareness that, 
at least Secretary of State Powell, would strongly oppose the program.102 It 
appears a conscious decision was made not to brief the President in 2002, 
and that he was not briefed on the program until 2006 (although his own 
memoir contradicts this claim).103 
 96. Yoo, supra note 59.
 97. Cole, supra note 84, at 10.
 98. senate seleCt Committee on intelligenCe, supra note 37, at 42.
 99. Id. “Findings and Conclusions” at 4.
100. See, e.g., id. at 98–99.
101. Id. at 38.
102. Id. at 119.
103. Id. at 38, 40.
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But the most telling factor of the CIA’s plan of secrecy is the lengths 
to which it was willing to go regarding the disposal of detainees. In July 
2002, even as legal approval for “enhanced interrogation” was still being 
contemplated, the CIA discussed tactics that might be necessary should 
Abu Zubaydah die while being interrogated. The CIA determined that the 
best option would be cremation. The CIA interrogation team emphasized 
the need to make sure that Abu Zubaydah never revealed what had been 
done to him, specifically by keeping him isolated and incommunicado. CIA 
headquarters agreed, stating 
There is a fairly unanimous sentiment within HQS that [Abu Zubaydah] will 
never be placed in a situation where he has any significant contact with others 
and/or has the opportunity to be released. . . . [Abu Zubaydah] should remain 
incommunicado for the remainder of his life. This may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] 
from being turned over to another country.104 
In other words, monitoring and oversight was specifically and consciously 
avoided. The program was shielded from any possible disagreeing voices. The 
torture, therefore, could not be prevented via concerns of public opinion, 
pressure from international or domestic NGOs, or institutional oversight, 
as torturers were assured that their activities would never be discovered. 
It is unclear whether disclosure to the public would have mattered. 
While polls disagree regarding the precise percentage of the population that 
accepts torture as a legitimate interrogation tactic, it appears that a majority 
of the public approves of the use of torture, at least in rare circumstances.105 
An analysis of public opinion polls over eight years suggests that the public 
is at least evenly split regarding acceptance of torture.106 This even split 
would be unlikely to exert the type of political pressure necessary to fully 
disincentivize the use of torture (and in fact, it appears it was not).
CIA officials were aware of this opening in public opinion, and strate-
gically utilized it. Once discovery of the program appeared inevitable, the 
Deputy Director of the Counter Terrorism Center emphasized the need to 
“sell” the program to the public, so that Congress would not cut authorities 
or funds.107 Shortly thereafter, CIA officials began appearing on news pro-
grams, emphasizing the “successes” of the program.108 Claiming that torture 
had saved lives was a preemptive public relations strategy that CIA officials 
exploited to prevent public pressure to abandon the program. 
104. Id. at 34–35.
105. Paul Gronke, Darius Rejali, Dustin Drenguis, James Hicks, Peter Miller & Bryan Na-
kayama, U.S. Public Opinion on Torture, 2001–2009, 43 PS 437 (2010).
106. Id.
107. senate seleCt Committee on intelligenCe, supra note 37, at 194–95.
108. Id. at 196. As the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s report makes clear, these 
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Rather than taking action from the outside, some have argued that instill-
ing human rights norms in government actors could lessen the likelihood 
of human rights violations, such as torture.109 One might hope that torture 
will cease to exist if those who are in a position to torture are socialized so 
that such behavior is “unimaginable”.110 
Yet here, again, the post-2001 use of torture by the CIA highlights the 
problems of relying on this approach. First, the relevant actors in this case 
took care to avoid the watchful eyes of those members of the executive 
branch who had been successfully socialized to respect human rights, i.e. 
the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. Second, the development 
of the program by, seemingly, very few actors shows the inherent difficulty 
of successfully socializing every single member of the executive branch. 
Coercive interrogations appear to have been largely led by one CIA officer 
who had been involved in abusive interrogation over the course of the 1980s 
and was put in charge of the interrogation program in fall of 2002,111 as 
well as a pair of contractors who had no training in interrogation.112 In such 
cases, it is unlikely that human rights training could be assured; certainly, it 
seems unlikely that all such actors could be socialized to the point where 
human rights abuses are “unimaginable.”
Finally, even where socialization has been successful, personal reluctance 
may be overcome in the climate of fear and irrationality that follows violent 
attacks. The tendency to follow orders even in the face of extreme abuses is 
well documented,113 particularly where the orders given are justified based 
on a cause the actor identifies with and finds to be convincing.114 
This dynamic can be seen in the SSCI Report as well. The Report shows 
that, on orders from CIA headquarters, interrogation teams continued to 
torture detainees even in the cases of detainees who, they believed, were 
compliant.115 The Report describes the team’s negative reaction to this pres-
sure,116 and even the personal dislike (at least some) interrogators had of 
their activities: 
109. Conrad & Moore, supra note 6.
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CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN reported being disturbed by the use 
of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
CIA records include the following reactions and comments by CIA personnel:
•  August 5, 2002: “want to caution [medical officer] that this is almost certainly 
not a place he’s ever been before in his medical career. . . It is visually and 
psychologically very uncomfortable.”
•  August 8, 2002: “Today’s first session. . . had a profound effect on all staff 
members present. . . it seems the collective opinion that we should not go 
much further . . . everyone seems strong for now but if the group has to 
continue. . . we cannot guarantee how much longer.”
•  August 8, 2002: “Several on the team profoundly affected. . . some to the 
point of tears and choking up.”
•  August 9, 2002: “two, perhaps three [personnel] likely to elect transfer” away 
from the detention site if the decision is made to continue with the CIA’s 
enhanced interrogation techniques.”117 
Yet the torture continued, suggesting once again that fostering respect for 
human rights and personal aversion to torture is not the best way to protect 
these interests.
Instead, we should look to what did work to prevent and pause the 
torture, if only briefly, in the history of the CIA’s detention program. That 
was the threat of criminal prosecutions. 
V. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the discovery of the CIA’s institutionalized torture, there have 
been repeated calls for “truth commissions” and tell-all reports to clear the 
air and establish what exactly occurred.118 These calls are based on several 
considerations, including the likelihood of prosecutions occurring, the use-
fulness of obtaining a full and honest retelling of what actually occurred 
from 2002 to 2008, and a desire to allow victims the opportunity to make 
their narratives known to the general public so that society can heal from 
its wounds.119 In what appears to be a peak of desperation, the American 
117. Id. at 44–45.
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Civil Liberties Union called for the pardoning of those responsible for the 
CIA’s use of torture, if only to reiterate to the public that torture is in fact a 
crime, even if politicians refuse to pursue prosecutions.120
Those who have called for prosecutions have done so on the basis of the 
legal obligations of the United States, the legal support for prosecutions, the 
general effects on broader culture that are caused by a failure to prosecute, 
and the need to silence continuing efforts to defend the program.121 
This article suggests a more direct reason to strengthen calls for prosecu-
tion rather than truth commissions or national inquiries. Specifically, this 
article suggests that prosecutions can work. As has been shown above, those 
individuals responsible for instigating and perpetuating torture diligently 
researched their own legal liability. The likelihood of prosecution was specifi-
cally evaluated and found to be negligible before offenders proceeded. In 
moments when offenders believed they might be held criminally responsible 
for their actions, the use of torture ceased. Specific tactics that individuals 
or agencies believed might bring criminal responsibility were avoided. 
The power of criminal sanctions is understandable when examined in 
the context of criminological literature on deterrence. This literature reminds 
us that the promise of deterrence must be evaluated in relation to the spe-
cific characteristics of the individuals one is trying to deter. While criminal 
prohibitions of torture might not deter many individuals, the difficulty of 
achieving policymaking positions in government make institutionalized 
torture far more deterrable than most street crimes. This fact is evidenced 
by the CIA’s long debates and hesitations regarding their own policy. 
Importantly, this hesitation remained in the face of numerous other 
protections from (noncriminal) liability that human rights scholars have 
traditionally suggested as ways by which to curb human rights violations. 
Many elite government actors had been socialized to respect human rights, 
but this was overcome, in some cases by perceived need, and in other cases 
by purposeful avoidance and concealment. Institutional oversight, therefore, 
was doomed from the beginning. Yet somehow, the threat of criminal pros-
ecution remained a powerful deterrent even in the face of the CIA’s faith 
in its secrecy. This suggests not only that criminal prosecution can prevent 
future abuses, but that it may work where nothing else will. 
The CIA’s use of torture and its moments of hesitation, offer an important 
reminder that government policies are imagined and carried out by individu-
als acting under the influence of their social situation and personal char-
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acteristics. It suggests that disciplines, such as criminology and psychology 
may have far more to offer in this area, and that criminological, as well as 
psychologically based research should be utilized by human rights activists, 
rather than purely political science perspectives. Indeed, rather than insulat-
ing potential offenders, the complexity of government institutions appears to 
provide the opportunity for potential criminal offenders to be refocused on 
their own rational interests, and to see the possible conflict between their 
own interests and potential criminal behavior. 
This case study suggests that deterrence may be even more effective in 
these circumstances than in response to the conventional criminal behavior 
against which it is most often tested. It is possible, as I have suggested above, 
that this strength is due to the high social investment of these actors. How-
ever, it is also possible that it is in part due to the uncertain ground upon 
which the actors found themselves. Domestic criminal liability for torture 
had only been available since 1994, and there have been no prosecutions 
since that time.122 But the elite government actors involved in creating the 
US torture policy were likely aware of its passage, and of the possibility of 
criminal liability. This may have created a heightened perception of risk, i.e. 
the amount of consideration and credence that these potential offenders gave 
to the idea that they might be caught and prosecuted.123 
Moreover, with the availability of legal personnel to explain the extent 
of that risk, it was easy to investigate the matter rather than hazard a guess 
and risk prosecution. The attorneys’ warnings that some, but not all activity 
created a high risk of sanctions may have carried more weight at that point. 
The opportunity to engage in some abusive questioning, even if refraining 
from the extent of abuse originally desired, may have offered a desirable 
compromise that also served to remind government actors to protect them-
selves from prosecution.
It is also interesting to note the restraint of government attorneys in 
attempting to find legal justifications for clearly illegal behavior. These ef-
forts show the need for further research to evaluate the strength of legal 
socialization as another way to further the strength of the rule of law and 
human rights. 
In sum, this article presents a ray of hope, but also a warning. The fact 
that the United States government officially instituted a torture policy in 
the wake of the terror attacks of 2001 should not be seen as proof that all 
states behave exceptionally, ignoring the rule of law and human rights in 
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times of crisis. To the contrary, statutes prohibiting the use of torture may 
be extremely effective in preventing, rather than merely rectifying, abuses. 
The rule of law showed its weaknesses, but also its strengths in the CIA’s 
moments of debate and hesitation. 
Deterrence theory also suggests that the failure to prosecute is likely 
to breed more lawless behavior if it is allowed to stand. Perception of risk 
is strongly affected by past experience or knowledge of criminal behavior, 
and whether that behavior was punished.124 The history of torture in the 
United States post-2001, the CIA’s careful research into the legality and 
possible criminal liability of CIA actions, and Yoo’s legal research performed 
into prior cases, highlight the prominence of prior examples of criminality 
and responses to that criminality in the rational analyses of these particular 
types of offenders.
These facts underscore the need to press for criminal prosecutions inter-
nationally and domestically. The CIA’s enhanced interrogation program shows 
both the promises and the failures of human rights law to date. Here, we 
have an opportunity for prosecutors to engage in behavior that will actually 
prevent crime. All that is required is for those prosecutors to act.
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